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Abstract
Understanding the implications of increased foreign bank presence is especially
compelling in periods of financial crisis. In this paper, we explore this issue by exam-
ining the relationship between the involvement of foreign banks in the banking sys-
tems and the volatility of key macroeconomic variables in normal and crisis periods.
Using a sample of 20 Emerging European countries from 1998 to 2013, we find that
an increase in the assets of foreign banks in the banking system reduces output and
consumption growth volatility in general but does not significantly affect the volatil-
ity of investments. However, these banks were found to play a significant role in
increasing output, consumption and investment volatility in 2009. Our findings sug-
gest that foreign banks’ harmful impact during the global crisis was only temporary
and that they seem to help Emerging European countries stabilize macroeconomic
volatility in normal times and after the global crisis.
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1. Introduction
The 2008/2009 global financial crisis reignited the debate on the stabilizing force of
foreign banks. These banks were accused of playing a significant role in transmitting
the crisis to emerging market economies (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). Although
several countries with significant foreign bank presence have indeed experienced
periodic collapses in growth rates, as well as financial crises resulting in substantial
macroeconomic and social costs (Agenor, 2013), foreign banks have many positive
effects, such as promoting banking sector efficiency, providing greater access to
resources from abroad and improving lending practices in the host countries. Devel-
oping countries, with their relatively low levels of capital and inherently greater
volatility, seem to gain the most from the presence of foreign banks and several
other forms of financial integration (Agenor, 2003; Prasad et al., 2007).
Over the past decade, many emerging and developing economies have attracted
strong capital inflows and allowed active participation of foreign banks. Until the
recent global financial turmoil, these countries seemed to be in a good position to
reap the benefits of such developments. However, the crisis reshaped the debate on
whether foreign banks are a destabilizing force, increasing volatility rather than pro-
moting growth. On the one hand, they are expected to improve growth and reduce
volatility by providing loans, even during domestic or local crises. On the other
hand, they may withdraw their resources during downturns or when they face
problems in their home countries, causing more volatility in emerging economies. In
this paper, we examine the association between foreign bank presence and volatility
in real GDP growth rate and its components, mainly consumption and investment,
for a sample of Emerging European countries over the period 1998–2013.2 We also
analyze how this relationship changed during the 2008/2009 global crisis. In the
analysis, foreign bank presence is measured with the share of these banks in the
total assets of the banking system of each country.
In the literature, although several studies analyze the role of foreign banks in
financial stability (see, e.g., Barth et al., 2006; De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006, 2014),
the effects of these banks on macroeconomic fluctuations have not been much exam-
ined. Among the few studies that investigate this relationship, Morgan et al. (2004)
find that macroeconomic volatility, defined as fluctuations in employment growth,
fell significantly as banks became more integrated with out-of-state banks in the
United States. Such banks can be considered ‘foreign’ because most States forbade
entry by banks from other States during the sample period of 1976–1994. In another
study, Morgan and Strahan (2004) present evidence that foreign banks amplify
volatilities of investment spending growth in a sample of Latin American countries.
2 As in Bergl€of et al. (2010), we define Emerging Europe broadly. The countries analyzed in this study are
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia Republic, Slove-
nia, Turkey and Ukraine.
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However, when they analyze a broader sample of countries, they observe zero or a
positive association between the volatility of a country’s real GDP or investment
growth and the share of assets owned by foreign banks. Although some Latin Amer-
ican countries experienced domestic crises during the sample period of 1990–1997,
there was no global financial shock in this period.
Emerging European countries provide an ideal setting for examining the rela-
tionship between macroeconomic volatility and foreign banks in the aftermath of
the global crisis. Of all regions, Emerging Europe has been most affected by the cri-
sis and foreign-owned banks have remained dominating forces in the region. Since
the early 1990s, the less-developed financial systems of these countries offered sig-
nificant growth opportunities and a high return on direct investment, with foreign
banks holding 63.57 percent of total banking assets by 2013, up from 24.03 percent
in 1998 (see Table A1). Before the 2008/2009 global crisis began, the flood of cheap
credit encouraged overborrowing, helped inflate asset price bubbles and increased
possible vulnerabilities in the region (see Allen et al., 2011). Emerging Europe was
thus badly affected by the global economic downturn, with annual real GDP falling
by 6.08 percent in 2009, the greatest decrease worldwide.3 Furthermore, several
studies report that foreign banks reduced their lending more than domestic banks
during the crisis period, especially in this region (Cull and Martınez Perıa, 2013; De
Haas and van Lelyveld, 2014). On examining the effect of financial deepening gener-
ated by foreign banks among Emerging European countries, we try to fill the gap in
the literature on how these banks may affect macroeconomic volatility in a global
credit crunch.
Analyzing the role of foreign banks in 20 Emerging European countries during
normal and global crisis periods, we find that an increase in the assets of foreign
banks in the banking system reduces output and consumption growth volatilities in
general but does not significantly affect the volatility of investments. During the cri-
sis years of 2008/2009, foreign banks were found to increase macroeconomic volatil-
ity only in 2009. However, this amplifying effect seemed to be temporary. Our
empirical findings are robust when we measure foreign bank presence with the
foreign bank assets-to-GDP ratio and when we measure volatility with squared
residuals. We find similar results when we control for foreign bank presence in the
first-stage estimations of growth rates. Moreover, the results are robust when we
exclude countries that participated in the Vienna Initiative, which ensured that par-
ent banks maintained their exposures and recapitalized their subsidiaries during the
initial stages of the crisis.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on macroeco-
nomic growth and volatility and foreign banks. Section 3 presents the empirical
model and the data. Section 4 reports the results and the outcomes of several robust-
ness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper.
3 According to the World Development Indicator statistics, the greatest decline in 2009 was 17.95 percent in
Latvia; followed by Ukraine, 14.8 percent; Lithuania, 14.74 percent and Estonia, 14.73 percent.
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2. Literature review
Financial sector foreign direct investment is a relatively new phenomenon, and
typically takes the form of banks in industrialized countries establishing branches
and facilities in developing countries (Goldberg, 2007). Following the fall of the
Soviet Union, global banks began to enter Eastern Europe. The increase in foreign
bank presence is arguably one of the most striking developments in the banking sys-
tems of transition economies (Bonin and Schnabel, 2011; Buch, 1997; Naaborg et al.,
2004). As emphasized in Levine (1996), foreign banks may promote financial devel-
opment directly by providing high-quality banking services, and indirectly by
affecting domestic banks and regulators, spurring them to improve quality, cut costs
and/or enhance economic efficiency.4 These banks also accelerate the process of har-
monizing regulatory and supervisory procedures and standards (Crystal et al.,
2002). Moreover, they are found to benefit firms by stimulating growth in their sales
and assets (Giannetti and Ongena, 2009) and by lowering their financing obstacles
(Clarke et al., 2006).
A number of papers show that foreign institutions strengthen financial stability
in emerging markets by improving the solvency and liquidity of the host countries’
banking systems (see, e.g., Caprio and Honohan, 2002). Banking sector solvency
improves because foreign banks are better capitalized than their domestic counter-
parts. Moreover, foreign banks mitigate the risk of sudden stops and capital flow
reversals because parent banks will provide the needed international liquidity in
crisis periods to safeguard their investments in the respective countries. For exam-
ple, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) find that foreign banks did not abandon the
local market during the 1997/1998 crisis in Malaysia. Similarly, Goldberg et al.
(2000) present evidence that lending by foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico
grew faster than lending by domestic banks during the 1994/1995 crisis. Altham-
mer and Haselmann (2011) theoretically show that foreign banks do not reduce
their lending in emerging markets experiencing banking crises because they have
better screening and monitoring mechanisms than domestic banks. Furthermore,
Grittersova (2014) shows that a high level of foreign bank ownership is positively
associated with the perceived credit quality of host countries’ sovereign debt, espe-
cially in transition and developing countries that face difficulties raising money in
financial markets.
In contrast to these findings, there is evidence that foreign banks might impair
financial stability. For example, Peek and Rosengren (2000) argue that foreign bank
penetration may weaken the position of the domestic banking system. Domestic
banks unable to cope with the increased competitive pressure may fail and countries
may experience periods of severe financial instability. Galindo et al. (2013) examine
4 There is ample evidence that foreign banks improve the efficiency of domestic banks (see, e.g., Bonin et al.,
2005a,b; Claessens et al., 2001; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005; Poghosyan and Poghosyan,
2010).
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whether greater participation of foreign banks exacerbates the adverse effect of a
foreign shock on domestic credit growth, and estimate its cost. They find that finan-
cial integration captured through foreign bank participation amplifies the impact of
international financial shocks on aggregate real credit and real interest rate fluctua-
tions. Cull and Martınez Perıa (2013) examine the impact of bank ownership on
credit growth in Eastern Europe and Latin America before and during the 2008/
2009 crisis. They find that loan growth by foreign banks was high prior to the crisis
only in Eastern Europe and fell more than that of domestic private banks in these
countries during the crisis period, driven largely by an excessive decrease in corpo-
rate loans. Similarly, De Haas and van Lelyveld (2014) report that the reduction in
the credit growth rate of multinational bank subsidiaries was almost three times fas-
ter than domestic banks during the 2008/2009 global crisis, controlling for other
bank characteristics.
While foreign bank presence and its implications for local banking systems or
financial stability have been investigated in the literature, studies examining the
direct effect of foreign banks on macroeconomic stability5 are limited. Using these
related but separate strands of literature, one can indirectly associate foreign banks
with economic stability. Although a consensus has not been reached, foreign
banks do have some impact on financial development.6 In addition, there is a liter-
ature on the contribution of financial development to macroeconomic stability.
Among very few theoretical studies, it is shown that the effect of financial devel-
opment on volatility depends on the stage of the country’s development (Aghion
et al., 2004) or the type of shocks affecting the economy (Bacchetta and Caminal,
2000).
To our knowledge, only two papers in the literature focus on the association
between the presence of foreign banks and economic volatility. Measuring macroe-
conomic volatility with deviations from the expected employment growth rate,
Morgan et al. (2004) show that the share of a state’s bank assets that is owned by
a multi-state bank holding company is negatively associated with macroeconomic
volatility for the period 1976–1994 in the US. Hence, they provide evidence that
out-of-state banks had a stabilizing effect on economic activity among US states.
When Morgan and Strahan (2004) examine the relationship between foreign banks
and macroeconomic volatility for a sample of countries rather than states for the
period 1990–1997, they find zero or a positive association between foreign banks
and macroeconomic volatility, measured with deviations of real GDP growth and
real investment spending growth from their expected growth rates. Their sample
period is relatively short and coincides with the early years of the entry of foreign
banks into the host countries. The average share of bank assets controlled by
5 Klomp and De Haan (2009) provide an excellent review of the literature on macroeconomic volatility.
6 Detragiache et al. (2008) and Claessens and van Horen (2014) present a negative effect of foreign bank pres-
ence on financial development, unlike Bonin et al. (2005a,b), Claessens et al. (2001), Focarelli and Pozzolo
(2005), and Fries and Taci (2005).
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foreign banks in the majority of their sample countries (except those in Latin
America) was small. The average market share of foreign banks was only 18.7 per-
cent for the Latin American countries, in which they observe a positive link with
foreign banks and volatility in investment growth but no significant association
between foreign banks and output volatility. Moreover, their sample period does
not cover a large-scale financial crisis, which may compel foreign banks to change
their behaviour.
In this paper, we examine foreign bank presence in Emerging European coun-
tries that have substantially altered the financial landscape and governance of
banks in these countries. Such banks became dominant in many Central, Eastern
and Baltic states; assets of foreign banks in some of the region’s countries account
for 89 percent to 96 percent of the overall bank assets as of 2013. Considering that
a sizeable portion of the private sector credit in Emerging Europe was funded by
foreign banks even during the 2008/2009 crisis, we aim to understand how the
association between economic stability and foreign participation in banking
changes in countries with high foreign bank presence, and over normal and crisis
periods.
3. Empirical methodology
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the extent to which macroeconomic
fluctuations are related to the presence of foreign banks in the domestic market and
examine not only output volatility but also its components, mainly the volatility of
consumption and investments.7 Empirically analyzing the link between macroeco-
nomic volatility and foreign banks includes several challenges. The first challenge is
measuring macroeconomic volatility. The second challenge is the potential endo-
geneity between economic volatility and foreign bank presence. To deal with these
challenges, we proceed with the estimations in two steps (see, e.g., Aghion et al.,
2009; Morgan et al., 2004). In the first step, we estimate the growth model for three
macroeconomic variables (real GDP, real consumption and real investment) to
derive predictable movements in their growth rates, controlling for country and
year effects. In the second step, we examine the relationship between foreign banks
and macroeconomic volatility, measured by the residuals obtained in the first step.
We use both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) estimations
in the second step.
7 Although net export is another component of economic growth volatility, we do not analyze it in this paper.
As emphasized in the literature on international aspects of the business cycle (see e.g., Prasad, 1998), net
export volatility requires a different empirical framework, including dynamics in the trade balance in response
to various macroeconomic shocks. Furthermore, its share in GDP is small compared to consumption and
investment.
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3.1 The model
The specification of the regressions for GDP, consumption and investment growth
rates are broadly similar to Bekaert et al. (2005). Thus, the following fixed effects
model is estimated in the first step8:
GROWTHit ¼ gi þ lt þHCONTROLit þ eit; ð1Þ
where gi, lt and CONTROLit represent country and year fixed effects and a vector of
control variables, respectively. Control variables include trade openness of a coun-
try, measured as the GDP share of total exports and imports, foreign direct invest-
ment to GDP ratio, external (private and public) debt as a percentage of GDP, rate of
population growth, years of secondary education as a proxy for human capital, gov-
ernment consumption-to-GDP ratio, unemployment rate, life expectancy and infla-
tion rate of country i at time t. In the model, we also include the lagged values of the
growth rates in real GDP or real consumption or real investment expenditures.9
The residuals estimated in the first-step regressions10 are used as proxies for
growth rate volatilities, as in Morgan et al. (2004). In general, studies that examine
macroeconomic volatility use standard deviations of the growth rate as a measure
of volatility. However, constructing time series volatilities by rolling windows with
fixed sizes and computing standard deviations for every window generates a serial
correlation in the resulting time series. Moreover, in the rolling-window approach,
outliers have a level effect and it is not easy to identify shocks. Because we try to
estimate how the relationship between foreign banks and macroeconomic volatility
changed during the global crisis, we do not employ this approach. Our volatility
measure, VOLit, is defined as the absolute value of the deviation of the actual
growth rates from the estimated growth rates of output, consumption and invest-
ment for country i and year t using the model specified in Equation (1).
To examine the relationship between foreign banks and macroeconomic volatil-
ity, we estimate the following model (Model I):
VOLit ¼aþ bForeign Banksit þ cBank Concentrationit
þ wPrivate Creditsit þ dREERit þ uit:
Foreign Banks is our main variable of interest and is measured by the share of for-
eign bank assets in the total banking system. As mentioned above, the presence of
8 We estimate different models for each component of GDP by variables such as expected output or rule of
law, as in Beck and Laeven (2006). However, we find no variable that may affect consumption and investment
growth differently and hence we use the same model to predict the growth rate of real GDP and its
components.
9 Modelling growth is difficult in time series analysis. Several variables affect growth, and some econometric
problems, such as endogeneity, arise. We follow the solution suggested by Sims (1980) and use the lagged val-
ues of a dependent variable as an explanatory variable.
10 The results of the models estimated in the first step are presented in the Appendix (Table A2).
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foreign banks usually contributes to the institutional strength of the banking system
by increasing resilience to failures, especially local failures; but heavy reliance on
foreign banks could be destabilizing if they transmit foreign shocks across borders.
Therefore, we do not have a priori expectations regarding the sign of the coefficient
of Foreign Banks in explaining macroeconomic volatility.
The estimation of Model I by OLS may suffer from an endogeneity bias because
the presence of foreign banks and other financial variables are likely to be driven by
business cycle fluctuations to some extent. In the literature, there is evidence that
foreign bank participation increases in periods of high volatility. For example, Car-
dim de Carvalho (2000) shows that the banking crisis of 1995 created an opportunity
for foreign banks to acquire local banks in Brazil. Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2011)
show that foreign banks entered some Central and Eastern European countries
when the economies were poor and growing slowly in the period 1993–2005. In a
cross-country study, Mathieson and Roldos (2001) show that a banking crisis raises
foreign participation in the banking system by about 10 percentage points. On the
other hand, foreign banks may reduce their assets in host countries when they
observe volatility as experienced during the 2008/2009 global crisis (Claessens and
van Horen, 2014). We test the endogeneity between foreign bank and volatility vari-
ables using the Durban and the Wu-Hausman tests.11 We fail to reject the null
hypothesis that they are exogenous. Nevertheless, we also use instrumental variable
(IV) approach in the estimations. We follow Morgan and Strahan (2004) in the deter-
mination of IVs and use language dummy variables,12 the average foreign bank
assets-to-GDP ratio and the contribution of the country’s bank assets to the total
bank assets in each language group in each year as IVs in the estimations.13
In the model, we control for other factors that might affect macroeconomic
volatility: concentration in the banking sector (Bank Concentration), financial devel-
opment (Private Credits) and change in the real effective exchange rate (REER). From
the period 1998–2002, Emerging European countries significantly restructured their
banking industries. Mergers and acquisitions, failures, entries of new financial insti-
tutions and subsequent bank consolidations affected the competitive environment
in the banking sectors of regional economies. Banking sector concentration, which is
defined as the asset shares of the largest five banks, is included in the model in order
to control for the effect of possible problems in a few large institutions or the exis-
tence of higher financial intermediation costs in concentrated markets on aggregate
lending and macroeconomic stability.
11 The results of these tests are reported at the bottom of Tables 2–4 for GDP, consumption and investment
volatility models.
12 Based on their origins, we classify the countries into the following language groups: Albanian, Uralic, Bal-
tic, Latin, Turkish, Southern Slavic, Eastern Slavic and Western Slavic.
13 When we test the joint significance of all of the instruments, we see that the instruments are jointly signifi-
cantly different from zero, with a P-value of 0.000 (F(9, 267) = 26.9497). The adjusted R2 is 0.5813 and the par-
tial R2 is 0.4760. These test results suggest that our instruments are strong.
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We include Private Credits in our model to control for financial development in
each country. Although the theoretical literature outlines various mechanisms
through which financial development can affect macroeconomic volatility, empiri-
cally there is no consensus on the effects of financial development, which is proxied
with a private credits-to-GDP ratio. Deeper financial systems can dampen volatility
by alleviating firms’ cash constraints, particularly in economies with tight interna-
tional financial constraints (Beck et al., 2006; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2001;
Dabla-Norris and Srivisal, 2013). At the same time, financial development can lead
to more risk-taking or facilitate overleverage, both of which could potentially drive
up volatility (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010).
The increasing absorptive capacity of capital through the entry of foreign banks in
Emerging European countries is accompanied by growing current account deficits. A
real exchange rate appreciation from large capital inflowsmay cause a loss of compet-
itiveness in these countries. Moreover, in many Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, large portions of domestic credit are denominated in foreign currency (Mihaljek,
2011). Hence, borrowers’ creditworthiness and their ability to service debt rely heav-
ily on exchange rate stability. In our model, we include the natural logarithm of the
real exchange rate as another variable to explain fluctuation in economic growth.
To determine whether the relationship between foreign bank presence and
macroeconomic volatility changed during the crisis years of our sample, we create
interaction variables between Foreign Bank and year dummy variables during the
pre-crisis (Y2007), crisis (Y2008, Y2009) and post-crisis periods (Y2010, Y2011, Y2012 and
Y2013). We then estimate another model (Model II) by including these interaction
variables to Model I. Considering the interconnectedness of financial institutions in
this region to Western Europe and troubled intermediaries even in 2007,14 we anal-
yze how this relationship changed starting from 2007.
3.2 Data
We examine the relationship between foreign bank presence and macroeconomic
volatility for a sample of 20 Emerging European countries. Although most banking
systems in the sample countries were bought and shaped by Western European
banking groups, there are some differences in the banking systems of countries we
examine in this study. The average share of foreign bank assets in the total assets of
the banking systems is more than 60 percent in the majority of the countries; how-
ever, it is <25 percent in Belarus, Slovenia, the Russian Federation and Turkey.
Table 1 presents the mean values of the variables used in the analysis at the country
level for the period between 1998 and 2013. Detailed definitions, other descriptive
statistics and data sources of the variables are reported in the Appendix in Table A3.
14 The bailout of IKB Deutsche Industriebank in July 2007 and the suspension of the money market funds of
French BNP Paribas and of the mortgage investments of Dutch lender NIBC Holding in August 2007 are some
examples of then-troubled European institutions.
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Over the sample period, the mean growth rate of real investment (5.47 per-
cent) was notably higher in the region compared to mean growth rates of real
GDP (3.63 percent) and real private consumption (4.34 percent). There is some
variation among countries in terms of growth rates of GDP and its compo-
nents. For example, average real investment annual growth rate in Belarus,
Bulgaria and Latvia was around or above 10 percent, whereas it was around 2
percent in Croatia (2.43 percent), the Czech Republic (1.96 percent), Hungary
(2.16 percent), the Slovak Republic (1.48 percent) and Slovenia (1.42 percent).
Similarly, average real consumption annual growth rate in Belarus was slightly
above 10 percent but it was below 2 percent in Croatia (1.32 percent), Hungary
(1.95 percent) and Slovenia (1.79 percent).
Figures 1A–F show the growth rates of real GDP, real consumption and
real investment in our sample countries, grouped as Central European and Bal-
tic (CEB) and South Eastern European (SEE) countries for presentation pur-
poses. Even though the growth rate in GDP had been stable before the crisis
in our sample countries, the growth rates in all countries declined in 2009. The
decline was more in CEB countries. The growth rate in real investments also
shows more variation in CEB countries than in SEE countries. Moreover, the
decline in real investment expenditures in 2009 was three times more than the
decline in real output and real consumption expenditures in most of the sam-
ple countries.
Since the late 1990s, the presence of foreign-owned banks in Emerging European
countries has increased dramatically (Figures 2A–B). The share of foreign banks on
the overall banking sector in most of the region’s countries seemed to have stabi-
lized by 2005. In addition to increased penetration of foreign banks in domestic
banking systems, we observe that the importance of foreign banks in the real econ-
omy (i.e., Foreign Bank Assets-to-GDP ratio) increased in all the Emerging European
countries over the sample period (Figures 2C–D).
The entry of foreign banks also influenced competition in the banking industry
in these countries. We report in Table 1 that on average, 64.66 percent of total bank-
ing assets were controlled by the five largest banks (CR5), suggesting a relatively
competitive banking market among the sample countries. Yet, there are also some
significant variations in banking concentration among these countries. For example,
in the 1998–2013 period, the average ratio of the five largest banks in Estonia
amounted to almost 96 percent of total assets, while it was below 50 percent in
Poland, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Ukraine.
The financial development indicator (namely, domestic credit to the private sec-
tor by deposit of money in banks and other financial institutions normalized by
GDP) was, on average, 40.5 percent during the sample period.
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Figure 1. GDP, consumption and investment growth rates in Central Eastern
European and Baltic (CEB) and South Eastern European (SEE) countries, 1998–2013.
(A) Real GDP growth rate in CEB countries; (B) Real GDP growth rate in SEE
countries; (C) Real consumption growth rate in CEB countries; (D) Real consumption
growth rate in SEE countries; (E) Real investment growth rate in CEB countries;
(F) Real investment growth rate in SEE countries
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4. Empirical findings
We use the absolute values of residuals from the first-step regressions as measures
of unexpected changes or volatility of real GDP, consumption and investment. The
empirical results of the second-step estimations using OLS and IV estimations that
examine the relationship between foreign banks and macroeconomic volatility are
presented in Tables 2–4.
Table 2, Panel A presents the estimated coefficients for Models I and II, explain-
ing the volatility of real GDP growth rate. Regardless of the estimation method
used, we observe a negative and significant association between the share of for-
eign banks in the banking system and output volatility, controlling for other fac-
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Figure 2. Foreign banks in Emerging European countries, 1998–2013. (A) Foreign
bank assets to total assets in CEB; (B) Foreign bank assets to total assets in SEE; (C)
Foreign bank assets to GDP in CEB; (D) Foreign bank assets to GDP in SEE
 2016 The Authors
Economics of Transition  2016 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Foreign Banks, Crisis and Fluctuations 459
Table 2. Foreign bank presence and volatility in real GDP growth rate
Panel A: Dependent variable: Real GDP growth volatility
OLS estimations IV estimations
Model I Model II Model I Model II
Intercept 2.538 4.260* 2.841 4.535*
(2.537) (2.567) (2.557) (2.582)
Bank Concentration 0.013* 0.014* 0.017** 0.017**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
REER 0.314 0.619 0.390 0.680
(0.552) (0.564) (0.555) (0.566)
Private Credits 0.007 0.003 0.010* 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Foreign Banks 0.008** 0.013*** 0.013** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Y2007 9 Foreign Banks 0.003 0.006
(0.004) (0.006)
Y2008 9 Foreign Banks 0.014* 0.016*
(0.007) (0.009)
Y2009 9 Foreign Banks 0.035*** 0.034***
(0.010) (0.010)
Y2010 9 Foreign Banks 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Y2011 9 Foreign Banks 0.010** 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)
Y2012 9 Foreign Banks 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.004)
Y2013 9 Foreign Banks 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.007)
Test of endogeneity
Durban (P-value) 0.1971 0.1941
Wu-Hausman (P-value) 0.2017 0.2209
Test of overidentifying restrictions
Hansen J-test (P-value) 0.0165 0.1262
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.113 0.013 0.097
F-statistics 1.69 4.25*** 1.92 3.72***
N 281 281 280 280
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size of foreign banks in the banking system of the host country had a significant
dampening effect on the volatility of real GDP growth rates over the sample per-
iod. Although these findings seem to contradict the results of Morgan and Strahan
(2004), we examine this relationship for a drastically different sample. The majority
of Emerging European countries in our sample have been experiencing extreme
dominance of foreign banks. Nevertheless, our results support the theoretical find-
ings of Aghion et al. (1999) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) that foreign
lenders smooth fluctuations by supplying scarce capital in emerging markets.
Moreover, as highlighted by Grittersova (2012), increasing foreign bank presence
in the total banking industry can be considered a provision of reputational capital
to host countries and makes their commitments more credible, suggesting output
stability in the host country.
When we focus on the period 2007–2013, we observe that the coefficients of For-
eign Banks increased significantly in the crisis years, 2008 and 2009, and in 2011
(Table 2, Panel A). The negative relationship between foreign banks and volatility
continued in 2007, but this relationship turned positive in 2009, as reported in
Table 2, Panel B. Bergl€of et al. (2010) argue that foreign banks have a mitigating
effect on output decline in Central and Eastern European countries by softening
bank lending outflows at the peak of crises, and thus preventing currency collapses
and systemic banking crises in this region in periods of global crisis. Our findings,
however, suggest that the large presence of these banks amplified output growth
volatility in 2009 among sample countries, supporting the evidence provided by
De Haas and van Lelyveld (2014), Cull and Martınez Perıa (2013) and Claessens
and van Horen (2014). These authors report that foreign banks reduced their lend-
ing earlier and faster than domestic banks during the recent crisis in Eastern Eur-
ope. However, the amplifying effect of these banks on output volatility during the
crisis period seems to disappear after 2009 as we observe a significant tranquilizing
effect of foreign banks on output volatility, especially in 2012 (Table 2, Panel B).
Panel B: Coefficient on Foreign Banks in years
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
OLS Estimations
Foreign Banks 0.010* 0.001 0.022*** 0.006 0.003 0.013** 0.007
IV Estimations
Foreign Banks 0.012 0.002 0.017** 0.011 0.008 0.019** 0.011
Notes: The numbers in parentheses in Panel A are heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. In Panel B,
F-statistics test the hypothesis that the coefficient of Foreign Banks in that year equals zero. *, ** and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 2. (Continued)
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Table 3. Foreign bank presence and volatility in real consumption growth rate
Panel A: Dependent variable: Real consumption growth volatility
OLS estimations IV estimations
Model I Model II Model I Model II
Intercept 2.217 3.631 2.525 3.694
(2.536) (2.584) (2.595) (2.662)
Bank Concentration 0.012 0.012 0.016* 0.016*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
REER 0.005 0.252 0.077 0.279
(0.540) (0.549) (0.547) (0.558)
Private Credits 0.014 0.007 0.016 0.011
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Foreign Banks 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.020** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Y2007 9 Foreign Banks 0.007 0.004
(0.013) (0.014)
Y2008 9 Foreign Banks 0.011 0.010
(0.010) (0.012)
Y2009 9 Foreign Banks 0.038*** 0.039***
(0.011) (0.012)
Y2010 9 Foreign Banks 0.004 0.006
(0.006) (0.008)
Y2011 9 Foreign Banks 0.005 0.000
(0.010) (0.009)
Y2012 9 Foreign Banks 0.012** 0.015**
(0.006) (0.007)
Y2013 9 Foreign Banks 0.004 0.012*
(0.007) (0.006)
Test of endogeneity
Durban (P-value) 0.268 0.2781
Wu-Hausman (P-value) 0.273 0.3108
Test of overidentifying restrictions
Hansen J-test (P-value) 0.019 0.1223
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.083 0.012 0.084
F-statistics 2.14* 3.30*** 1.88 3.32***
N 281 281 280 280
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Among the control variables, bank concentration is mainly found to be positively
and significantly associated with output growth volatility, supporting evidence in
the literature, that is, that bank concentration may lead to higher intermediation
margins which in turn could increase macroeconomic instability. We observe no sig-
nificant impact of real exchange rate and a weakly significant impact of financial
development on output volatility.
When volatility in consumption growth is examined, the coefficient of Foreign
Banks is found to be negative and significant for both models, suggesting a dampen-
ing effect of foreign banks on the fluctuations of private consumption expenditures
(Table 3). The coefficients increased significantly in 2009 but declined significantly
in 2012. These banks are found to have a significant amplifying effect on consump-
tion volatility in 2009, but no significant coefficient is observed in 2008. Although
Cull and Martınez Perıa (2013) showed that consumer loans declined significantly
both before and during the crisis in Eastern European countries, we do not observe
a significant effect of credit crunch in the region on consumption volatility in 2008.
Moreover, our findings suggest that the contraction in credit supply to households
that is found in other studies and foreign banks’ amplifying effect on consumption
growth volatility that we find seem to have only a temporary impact because almost
all of the coefficients of Foreign Banks after 2009 are negative and mostly significant,
indicating that foreign banks have continued to facilitate consumption smoothing
and lower consumption volatility since the crisis in Emerging Europe (Table 3,
Panel B).
The panel regression results for volatility of real investments are reported in
Table 4. No significant impact of foreign bank shares is found in explaining invest-
ment growth volatility during normal periods. However, we observe that foreign
banks are positively and significantly associated with volatility of investment
growth rates in 2009 (Table 4, Panel B). This finding is not surprising because Cull
and Martınez Perıa (2013) show that in Eastern Europe the decline in total lending
Panel B: Coefficient on Foreign Banks in years
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
OLS estimations
Foreign Banks 0.012 0.007 0.020** 0.023** 0.013 0.030*** 0.022**
F-statistics 1.66 0.67 4.66 5.78 1.77 8.81 4.01
IV estimations
Foreign Banks 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.029** 0.022* 0.038*** 0.034***
F-statistics 2.58 1.18 2.15 6.32 3.67 9.54 6.74
Notes: The numbers in parentheses in Panel A are heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. In Panel B, F-
statistics test the hypothesis that the coefficient of Foreign Banks in that year equals zero. *, ** and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 3. (Continued)
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Table 4. Foreign bank presence and volatility in real investment growth rate
Panel A: Dependent variable: Real investment growth volatility
OLS estimations IV estimations
Model I Model II Model I Model II
Intercept 4.634 0.457 3.926 0.966
(6.800) (6.769) (6.912) (6.965)
Bank Concentration 0.021 0.024 0.028 0.029
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
REER 2.463* 1.542 2.292 1.441
(1.461) (1.440) (1.481) (1.480)
Private Credits 0.023 0.051** 0.019 0.048*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025)
Foreign Banks 0.006 0.009 0.003 0.016
(0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022)
Y2007 9 Foreign Banks 0.029 0.020
(0.026) (0.024)
Y2008 9 Foreign Banks 0.029 0.031
(0.019) (0.022)
Y2009 9 Foreign Banks 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.021) (0.020)
Y2010 9 Foreign Banks 0.034 0.037
(0.023) (0.024)
Y2011 9 Foreign Banks 0.036 0.039
(0.027) (0.028)
Y2012 9 Foreign Banks 0.008** 0.014**
(0.017) (0.018)
Y2013 9 Foreign Banks 0.005 0.011**
(0.015) (0.018)
Test of endogeneity
Durban (P-value) 0.434 0.306
Wu–Hausman (P-value) 0.439 0.341
Test of overidentifying restrictions
Hansen J-test (P-value) 0.003 0.118
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.049 0.003 0.044
F-statistics 1.22 2.30** 1.18 2.16**
N 281 281 280 280
 2016 The Authors
Economics of Transition  2016 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
464 €Onder and €Ozyıldırım
by foreign banks during the crisis was primarily driven by reductions in corporate
loans.
We find a negative and significant association between financial development,
that is, Private Credits and investment growth volatility during the period 1998–
2013. This finding is consistent with previous findings (see e.g., Dabla-Norris and
Srivisal, 2013) as deeper financial systems facilitate greater diversification, reduce
dependence of firms’ investment decisions on internal cash flows and dampen
fluctuations.15
5. Robustness
We employ four robustness checks in our analysis. First, we measure the presence
of foreign banks in the local market using the ratio of foreign bank assets to GDP as
another proxy, indicating the importance of foreign banks in the real economy, as in
Buch et al. (2010). Table 5 reports only the estimated coefficients of foreign-bank
related variables in the second step and the results of the hypothesis testing whether
the coefficient of Foreign Banks in each year of the 2007–2013 period is significantly
different from zero. The findings for GDP, consumption and investment growth
volatilities are similar to those reported in Tables 2–4. In particular, in the output
and consumption regressions, the coefficients of Foreign Banks in explaining
Panel B: Coefficient on Foreign Banks in years
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
OLS estimations
Foreign Banks 0.020 0.020 0.083*** 0.025 0.027 0.017 0.014
F-statistics 0.77 0.74 11.96 1.05 1.16 0.42 0.26
IV estimations
Foreign Banks 0.004 0.015 0.076** 0.022 0.023 0.030 0.027
F-statistics 0.02 0.26 6.65 0.54 0.59 0.89 0.65
Notes: The numbers in parentheses in Panel A are heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. In Panel B, F-
statistics test the hypothesis that the coefficient of Foreign Banks in that year equals zero. *, ** and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 4. (Continued)
15 It can be argued that foreign banks may use different investment strategies during periods of unexpected
growth shortfalls (negative deviations) compared to periods when key macroeconomic variables are growing
more than expected (positive deviations). We separately examine how foreign banks and macroeconomic fluc-
tuations are related during these periods. We find significant and positive associations between foreign bank
presence and output volatility but no significant association between foreign banks and investment volatility
in the excess growth and shortfall growth years. However, foreign banks are found to play a significant con-
sumption smoothing role, especially in shortfall periods.
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OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Model I
Foreign Banks 0.008** 0.017** 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.006 0.021
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.025)
Model II
Foreign Banks 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.019 0.035
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024)
Y2007 9 Foreign Banks 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.037* 0.026
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.023)
Y2008 9 Foreign Banks 0.020* 0.020** 0.019 0.016 0.045** 0.043*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024)
Y2009 9 Foreign Banks 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.102*** 0.101***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021)
Y2010 9 Foreign Banks 0.011** 0.009* 0.000 0.005 0.052** 0.048*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.024) (0.025)
Y2011 9 Foreign Banks 0.015** 0.012** 0.005 0.001 0.070** 0.055*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.031) (0.031)
Y2012 9 Foreign Banks 0.004 0.001 0.009 0.014* 0.003 0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.018)
Y2013 9 Foreign Banks 0.010** 0.008 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.020)
Coefficient on Foreign Banks in years
2007 0.008 0.013 0.014 0.030** 0.018 0.010
F-statistics 1.29 2.26 2.07 5.23 0.52 0.08
2008 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.018 0.027 0.008
F-statistics 0.41 0.06 0.07 1.90 1.13 0.06
2009 0.022*** 0.017* 0.021** 0.011 0.083*** 0.066**
F-statistics 11.31 3.73 4.56 0.74 10.85 3.91
2010 0.006 0.005 0.022** 0.038*** 0.033 0.013
F-statistics 0.49 2.20 4.94 8.79 1.72 0.14
2011 0.006 0.000 0.017 0.032** 0.051* 0.020
F-statistics 0.00 1.14 2.32 5.93 3.25 0.34
2012 0.012* 0.021** 0.048*** 0.036*** 0.016 0.043
F-statistics 2.61 5.08 8.00 11.91 0.31 1.44
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macroeconomic volatility remain negative and statistically significant, regardless of
the model or the estimation method used. Moreover, a positive and significant coef-
ficient is observed in 2009 for output, consumption and investments. Nevertheless,
the findings suggest that foreign banks reduced the volatility of output and con-
sumption in 2007 and during the post-crisis period (2010–2013).
Second, it can be argued that because of endogenity between growth and foreign
bank presence, the Foreign Bank variable should be controlled in the first-step esti-
mation of growth rates. Hence, we estimate our model by controlling for foreign
bank assets to total assets in the first step. As evident from Table 6, our main find-
ings do not change; the negative and significant coefficient of foreign banks on out-
put and consumption fluctuations remains when we control for foreign banks in the
first stage. We observe the amplifying role of foreign banks in all macroeconomic
components in 2009 and the dampening role of these banks on consumption volatil-
ity since then.
As a third robustness check, we use the squared values of residuals from the
first-step regressions as measures of unexpected changes or volatility of real GDP,
consumption and investment. As evident from Table 7, the findings are very similar
to those reported in Tables 2–4. The dampening effect of foreign banks on GDP and
consumption volatility is found to be significant after 2009.
To eliminate the concerns of multinational bank groups about Emerging Eur-
ope’s financial stability, the Vienna Initiative was created to ensure sufficient fund-
ing for banks operating in the region. Participating countries were Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Serbia. With the Vienna Initiative, for-
eign banks agreed to maintain overall exposures and recapitalize subsidiaries.
Because the flow of additional capital continued to these countries during the crisis
period, we exclude these countries from our sample as a last robustness check and
estimate our models with the countries that did not participate in the Vienna Initia-
tive. The results are summarized in Table 8. We observe a significant and negative








OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
2013 0.006 0.015 0.023* 0.042*** 0.010 0.041
F-statistics 0.48 2.16 3.70 8.50 0.11 1.17
Notes: Only coefficients of foreign bank-related variables are reported. The numbers in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. F-statistics test the hypothesis that the coefficient of Foreign Banks
in that year equals zero. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
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OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Model I
Foreign Banks 0.008** 0.013** 0.014*** 0.020** 0.006 0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.021)
Model II
Foreign Banks 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.009 0.018
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.021)
Y2007 9 Foreign Banks 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.029 0.020
(0.004) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.026) (0.024)
Y2008 9 Foreign Banks 0.014* 0.015* 0.010 0.009 0.028 0.030
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.020) (0.022)
Y2009 9 Foreign Banks 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.092*** 0.091***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.022) (0.020)
Y2010 9 Foreign Banks 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.031 0.035
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024)
Y2011 9 Foreign Banks 0.009* 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.035 0.038
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.027) (0.028)
Y2012 9 Foreign Banks 0.000 0.001 0.011* 0.015** 0.007 0.013
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.018)
Y2013 9 Foreign Banks 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.011* 0.006 0.013
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.015) (0.018)
Coefficient on Foreign Banks in years
2007 0.010* 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.020 0.003
F-statistics 2.74 2.32 1.65 2.65 0.76 0.01
2008 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.013 0.018 0.012
F-statistics 0.02 0.07 0.70 1.25 0.65 0.18
2009 0.022*** 0.017** 0.021** 0.017 0.082*** 0.073**
F-statistics 12.61 4.76 4.76 2.13 11.55 6.21
2010 0.006 0.011 0.022** 0.029** 0.022 0.017
F-statistics 0.95 2.03 5.68 6.29 0.82 0.35
2011 0.004 0.010 0.012 0.022* 0.026 0.020
F-statistics 0.43 1.53 1.52 3.41 1.03 0.45
2012 0.013* 0.019** 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.016 0.030
F-statistics 3.83 5.24 8.14 9.11 0.36 0.93
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OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
2013 0.006 0.011 0.022* 0.033** 0.016 0.031
F-statistics 0.69 1.68 3.78 6.49 0.29 0.84
Notes: Only coefficients of foreign bank-related variables are reported. The numbers in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. F-statistics test the hypothesis that the coefficient of Foreign
Banks in that year equals zero. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1
percent levels, respectively.







OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Model I
Foreign Banks 0.042* 0.088* 0.104** 0.161* 0.125 0.263
(0.023) (0.046) (0.052) (0.088) (0.350) (0.561)
Model II
Foreign Banks 0.076*** 0.118*** 0.138*** 0.182** 0.189 0.519
(0.021) (0.043) (0.039) (0.076) (0.341) (0.546)
Y2007 9 Foreign Banks 0.017 0.029 0.112 0.092 0.773 0.515
(0.019) (0.028) (0.184) (0.192) (0.833) (0.697)
Y2008 9 Foreign Banks 0.102* 0.121 0.105 0.114 0.429 0.443
(0.062) (0.074) (0.102) (0.131) (0.403) (0.448)
Y2009 9 Foreign Banks 0.276*** 0.264*** 0.348*** 0.346*** 1.848*** 1.731***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.128) (0.133) (0.484) (0.428)
Y2010 9 Foreign Banks 0.027 0.027 0.073 0.091 0.711 0.783
(0.023) (0.029) (0.058) (0.075) (0.550) (0.565)
Y2011 9 Foreign Banks 0.035 0.037 0.031 0.018 0.825 0.867
(0.025) (0.030) (0.096) (0.096) (0.656) (0.682)
Y2012 9 Foreign Banks 0.007 0.008 0.105** 0.132** 0.197 0.281
(0.017) (0.023) (0.051) (0.067) (0.273) (0.300)
Y2013 9 Foreign Banks 0.023 0.034 0.083 0.129* 0.242 0.324
(0.027) (0.045) (0.059) (0.067) (0.240) (0.292)
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OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Coefficient on Foreign Banks in years
2007 0.059 0.088 0.026 0.090 0.584 0.004
F-statistics 1.78 2.47 0.07 0.54 0.92 0.00
2008 0.026 0.003 0.033 0.068 0.239 0.077
F-statistics 0.37 0.00 0.12 0.31 0.16 0.01
2009 0.200*** 0.146** 0.210** 0.164 1.658*** 1.212
F-statistics 18.68 6.64 4.28 1.78 6.75 2.42
2010 0.049 0.090 0.210** 0.273** 0.521 0.264
F-statistics 1.13 2.54 4.27 4.92 0.66 0.12
2011 0.041 0.081 0.107 0.199 0.635 0.348
F-statistics 0.70 1.93 1.01 2.50 0.90 0.19
2012 0.083 0.126** 0.243** 0.313** 0.386 0.801
F-statistics 2.66 4.30 4.78 5.64 0.31 0.92
2013 0.053 0.084 0.221* 0.310** 0.432 0.844
F-statistics 0.93 1.66 3.35 4.84 0.32 0.90
Notes: Only coefficients of foreign bank-related variables are reported. The numbers in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. F-statistics test the hypothesis that the coefficient of Foreign
Banks in that year equals zero. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1
percent levels, respectively.







OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Model I
Foreign Banks 0.006* 0.006 0.014** 0.022*** 0.002 0.006
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.020)
Model II
Foreign Banks 0.012*** 0.010* 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.014 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.020)
Y2007 9 Foreign Banks 0.005 0.006 0.016 0.014 0.008 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018)
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OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Y2008 9 Foreign Banks 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.038 0.042
(0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.023) (0.026)
Y2009 9 Foreign Banks 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.099*** 0.097***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018)
Y2010 9 Foreign Banks 0.009* 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.049 0.046
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.032) (0.034)
Y2011 9 Foreign Banks 0.012** 0.012* 0.015 0.011 0.056* 0.060*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.033) (0.035)
Y2012 9 Foreign Banks 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.019 0.014
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.022)
Y2013 9 Foreign Banks 0.012** 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.021)
Coefficient on Foreign Banks in Years
2007 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.012 0.006 0.000
F-statistics 0.82 0.22 0.19 0.86 0.05 0.00
2008 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.023 0.037
F-statistics 0.00 0.31 0.22 0.54 0.93 1.47
2009 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.027** 0.027** 0.085*** 0.092***
F-statistics 17.90 15.17 5.90 4.09 10.56 8.57
2010 0.003 0.002 0.022** 0.029** 0.034 0.041
F-statistics 0.15 0.07 3.97 4.82 1.70 1.68
2011 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.041 0.055*
F-statistics 0.01 0.05 0.23 1.10 2.16 2.92
2012 0.009 0.008 0.025** 0.030** 0.005 0.009
F-statistics 1.11 0.73 4.11 4.99 0.03 0.07
2013 0.001 0.001 0.021 0.029* 0.007 0.008
F-statistics 0.00 0.02 2.22 3.63 0.05 0.04
Notes: Only coefficients of foreign bank-related variables are reported. The numbers in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. F-statistics test the hypothesis that the coefficient of Foreign
Banks in that year equals zero. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1
percent levels, respectively.
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the whole sample period, regardless of the model or method used in the estimations.
The coefficients of interaction variables between foreign banks and year dummy
variables after 2009 are found to be positive and significant in explaining output
volatility but the coefficients of Foreign Banks in the post-crisis period are insignifi-
cant. A much greater magnitude of the coefficients of Foreign Banks in 2009 suggests
that the Vienna Initiative benefited countries in terms of reducing the impact of the
global shock during the crisis and thus aided the recovery periods.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the association between foreign bank presence and
economic volatility using a sample of 20 Emerging European countries over the
period 1998–2013. In particular, we focused on the global crisis period of 2008/
2009 to assess whether foreign banks have any effect on output, consumption
and investment growth volatilities. Our findings suggest that the increased pres-
ence of foreign banks in the domestic banking system can be considered a stabi-
lizing force in Emerging European countries in normal periods. Although foreign
banks resisted pulling out of the region in the global crisis, we found that they
amplified the fluctuation of GDP, consumption and investment growth rates in
2009. However, immediately after the crisis period they especially helped con-
sumption smoothing.
We also find that greater financial development is associated with lower invest-
ment growth volatility, indicating the importance of promoting financial access in
Emerging Europe. One way to enhance bank lending services is to provide them
through foreign banks. However, it seems that at this stage, these banks fail to stabi-
lize investment volatility. Considering our findings that foreign banks that partici-
pated in the Vienna Initiative further mitigated output and consumption volatility,
and considering the findings by De Haas et al. (2015) that foreign banks are stable
lenders in the region, policies to promote financial access and foreign ownership
may help mitigate macroeconomic fluctuations of possible shocks.
As a further study, one can examine cross-border lending to the region.
Although cross-border lending and lending by local brick-and-mortar subsidiaries
and branches are two different forms of lending, most emerging economies suffered
from the sharp slowdown of both flows during the recent global crisis. Hence, an
analysis of the impact of cross-border bank lending on macroeconomic fluctuations
will improve our understanding of different forms of financial integration.
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Table A2. First stage growth panel regressions
Dependent variable: Real growth rate in
GDP Consumption Investment
Intercept 80.149 12.367 157.396
(98.524) (143.482) (360.338)
Trade Openness 0.053*** 0.010 0.137**
(0.018) (0.026) (0.065)
FDI to GDP 0.030 0.024 0.072
(0.039) (0.057) (0.145)
Unemployment Rate 0.149* 0.345*** 0.422
(0.082) (0.115) (0.287)
Growth in Population 0.219** 0.017 1.104
(0.507) (0.738) (1.863)
Years in Secondary School 12.303*** 7.426 18.001
(4.439) (6.495) (16.264)
External Debt to GDP 0.016 0.014 0.062
(0.012) (0.017) (0.042)
Government to GDP 0.318*** 0.278* 0.231
(0.106) (0.154) (0.388)
Log(Expected Life) 23.025 2.632 117.300
(23.561) (34.300) (210.790)
Log(1 + Inflation) 3.353* 3.793 26.599***
(1.967) (2.813) (7.153)
Log(Growth)1 0.048 0.031 0.029
(0.066) (0.062) (0.064)
Adjusted R2 0.589 0.498 0.409
F-statistics 10.86*** 7.83*** 5.77***
N 304 304 304
Notes: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respec-
tively. The coefficients of country and year fixed effects are not reported to save space.
For the GDP, consumption and investment growth models, lagged levels of real GDP, consumption and
investment are used, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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